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LOSING THE SPIRIT OF TINKER V. DES MOINES AND THE
URGENT NEED TO PROTECT STUDENT SPEECH
By David L. Hudson, Jr.1
Nearly fifty (50) years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court declared in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District that public school students did
not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.”2 It remains the seminal case on K-12 student speech rights in
the United States of America3 and the “high water mark” of student rights.4 One
of the litigants in the Tinker case, the late Christopher Eckhardt5, stated: “What
George (Washington) and the boys did for white males in 1776, what Abraham
Lincoln did to a certain extent during the time of the Civil War for AfricanAmerican males, what the women's suffrage movement in the 1920s did for
women, the Tinker case did for children in America."6
The Tinker case led to a new era for student speech, increased litigation over
school dress codes and hairstyles and created a fundamental appreciation that
young persons were truly persons under the Constitution who had constitutional
rights that needed to be respected.7
Sadly, that day has passed and gone. Today courts increasingly restrict student
discourse even under the speech-protective standard that Justice Abe Fortas
pronounced for the Supreme Court in Tinker. Students live in an environment that
does not respect their constitutional rights. Sadly, this is creating a generation of
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younger persons who don’t have the same level of appreciation for the supreme
importance of freedom of speech.
This essay first examines the Tinker case and reminds readers of the powerful
language Justice Fortas used in his majority opinion. It explains that the test from
Tinker was designed to be a speech-protective standard for student litigants. The
second part of the essay evaluates several recent cases, which demonstrate that the
once speech-protective standard in Tinker has become a test that is often favorable
and deferential to school officials embroiled in student, free-speech controversies.
I. The Glory of Tinker and the Protection of Free Speech
The Tinker case arose in a time of great social activism. Many people exercised
their First Amendment rights to protest both the civil rights movement and the
Vietnam War. The Tinker family was no different. The patriarch of the family,
Leonard Tinker, had been removed from his church because of his stance against
racial discrimination. He also had worked for the pacifist organization, American
Friends Service Committee.8 Margaret Eckhardt, the mother of litigant
Christopher, was the president of the Des Moines chapter of the Women’s
International League for Peace and Freedom.9
The Tinker and Eckhardt families’ passion for social justice passed down to their
kids. Siblings John and Mary Beth Tinker, Christopher Eckhardt, and several
other students wore black armbands to their public schools to protest U.S.
involvement in Vietnam, to support Robert Kennedy’s Christmas truce, and to
mourn those who had died in the conflict.
School officials learned of the impending armband protest and quickly passed a
resolution prohibiting the wearing of such armbands. Interestingly, school
officials allowed students to wear other forms of symbolic speech, such as iron
crosses or political campaign buttons. Thus, the Tinker case was an early pristine
example of viewpoint discrimination – the public school targeting a specific
symbol associated with a specific political viewpoint.
The students wore their armbands in spite of the school rule and faced
suspensions from their principals. Ultimately, they sought vindication in the
courts. A federal district court judge ruled against them, ruling that school
officials “have an obligation to prevent anything which might be disruptive” of
the school atmosphere.10 He reiterated that “[u]nless the actions of school officials
… are unreasonable, the Courts should not interfere.”11
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The students appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit but
could do no better than a 4-4 split from the en banc court who issued only a oneparagraph opinion indicating the vote.12 That meant their only avenue of relief
could come from the Court of Last Resort – the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court
ruled 7-2 in favor of the students, proclaiming that students “do not shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.”13 In his majority opinion, Justice Fortas acknowledged that student speech
rights must be interpreted “in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment.”14
Fortas also noted that the students’ actions of wearing the black armbands was
“akin to pure speech”15 and that “the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of
this case was entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by
those participating in it.”16 Later, they emphasized the lack of disruptions caused
by the armband-wearing students, writing: “The school officials banned and
sought to punish petitioners for a silent, passive expression of opinion,
unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the part of petitioners.”17 He
added that there was “no evidence whatsoever” that the protesting students
interfered with the work of the school or intruded on the rights of other students.18
Fortas created what later became known as the Tinker standard or substantial
disruption test. He wrote that there was no “reason to anticipate that the wearing
of the armbands would substantially interfere with the work of the school or
impinge upon the rights of other students.”19 He later reiterated that student
speech should be protected unless the speech "materially and substantially
interfer[es] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school" and [does not] collid[e] with the rights of others.”20
The test has two parts – the substantial disruption part and the element of the
invasion or impingement of the rights of other students. Most of the litigation
post-Tinker has centered on what constitutes a substantial disruption or reasonable
12
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forecast of substantial disruption. However, more and more school districts have
expanded their anti-bullying policies to address cyberbullying or online
harassment.21 Given increased attention to cyberbullying, there likely will be
increased focus on the invasion of the rights of others part of Tinker.22
Much of Fortas’ opinion reads like an ode to the importance of protecting student
speech. Consider the following passages:
But, in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression. Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause
trouble.23
Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus,
that deviates from the views of another person may start an
argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we
must take this risk; and our history says that it is this sort of
hazardous freedom - this kind of openness - that is the basis of our
national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans
who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often
disputatious, society.24
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority
over their students. Students in school as well as out of school are
"persons" under our Constitution.25
In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate.
They may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments
that are officially approved.
Fortas reasoned that school officials had no reason to believe that the armbands
would cause a significant disruption or invade the rights of other students.26
JAMES C. HANKS. SCHOOL BULLYING: HOW LONG IS THE ARM OF THE LAW? 67 – 104 (2nd ed.
2015).
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Instead, school officials acted upon “an urgent wish to avoid the controversy
which might result from the expression.”27 He emphasized that school officials
suppressed the single symbol, the black armband, but allowed students to wear
other symbols, like political campaign buttons and even iron crosses.28
Fortas concluded that “the record does not demonstrate any facts which might
reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or
material interference with school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on
the school premises in fact occurred.”29
Several lessons emerge from the Tinker case. First, students possess the
fundamental right of free speech and that school officials’ power to restrict that
speech is limited. Second, school officials must point to specific evidence
showing that their fears of disruption are genuine, not based on “undifferentiated
fear or apprehension of disturbance” or merely a desire to avoid controversy.
Third it is not just any disruption, such a disruption must be material or
substantial. Perhaps most importantly, the Court’s entire emphasis was on
creating a speech-protective test for students.
The Tinker decision generated a flurry of litigation in public secondary schools.
The 1970s witnessed students challenging dress codes, hairstyles, censorship of
student papers, and a variety of other school regulations and policies. However,
the Supreme Court in the 1980s created two exceptions to Tinker. The Court ruled
in Bethel School District v. Fraser (1986) that school officials could prohibit
student speech that was vulgar, lewd, or plainly offensive.30 Two years later, the
Court adopted another deferential test for so-called school-sponsored student
speech in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (1988).31 Nearly two decades
later, the Court added a third Tinker carve-out for student speech that school
officials reasonably believes promotes the illegal use of drugs in Morse v.
Frederick, colloquially known as the “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” decision.32
These exceptions, or “Supreme Retractions, to Tinker have reduced significantly
the level of free-speech protections for students.33 Sadly, recent lower court
decisions have further eroded and corroded the once speech-protective test of
27
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Tinker. These decisions threaten the spirit of the Tinker decision. The substantial
disruption test of Tinker has turned from a student protective standard to one that
is often quite deferential to government officials. Two prominent examples are
Bell v. Itawamba School District34 and Dariano v Morgan Hill Unified School
District.35
II. Punishing the Rapping Whistleblower
John and Mary Beth Tinker are lauded (justifiably) as free-speech icons.
Eighteen-year-old, high school senior Taylor Bell was not accorded the same
respect. Bell, through his persona T-Bizzle, posted a rap recording on Facebook
and then YouTube criticizing two high school football coaches. 36 His song
criticized the two Caucasian coaches for allegedly sexually inappropriate
comments toward African-American female students. The song featured profanity
and language that some considered possibly threatening, such as the line “betta
watch your back/I’m a serve this nigga, like I serve the junkies with some
crack.”37
One of the coach’s wives heard the song and contacted her husband, who reported
it to an assistant principal. School officials sent Bell home that day.38 Later, the
school superintendent suspended Bell for “alleged threatening intimidation and/or
harassment of one or more school teachers.”39 After a hearing, a disciplinary
committee recommended to the school board that Bell face a seven-day
suspension and be placed in an alternative school for the remainder of the grading
period.40 The school board not only determined that Bell intimidated and harassed
the coaches but that his vulgar rap recording also threatened them. The board
upheld the punishment.41
Bell sued in federal court, contending school officials violated his First
Amendment free-speech rights. A federal district court ruled in favor of the
school defendants, finding that Bell’s rap song constituted “harassment and

34
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35
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intimidation of teachers and possible threats against teachers, and threatened,
harassed, and intimidated school employees.”42
Bell appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. A divided threejudge panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed and ruled in favor of Bell.43 The panel
majority determined that school official’s violated Bell’s First Amendment rights.
The majority reasoned that the rap song was not a true threat or substantially
disruptive under Tinker.44
However, the school board successfully sought en banc review and prevailed. The
en banc majority applied the Tinker test, determining that school officials
“reasonably could find Bell’s rap recording threatened, harassed, and intimidated
the teachers; and a substantial disruption reasonably could have been forecast, as
a matter of law.”45
The en banc majority emphasized the “recent rise in incidents of violence against
school communities”46 and “increasing concerns regarding school violence.”47
The majority noted that some students signal potential violence through
expression.48 The majority reasoned that Tinker applied to Bell’s off-campus
recording, because Bell intentionally directed his speech toward the school
community.49
Four justices wrote separate dissenting opinions. Judge James L. Dennis, who had
authored the majority opinion at the three-judge panel level, wrote the most
comprehensive dissent. He termed Bell a “student whistleblower”50, adding that
four female students had filed affidavits detailing incidents of sexual harassment
against the coaches that Bell mentioned in his song.51 Dennis emphasized that
Bell created the speech off-campus and contrasted that with the on-campus
42
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43
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expressive activities of the students in Tinker. He warned that the majority
opinion “allows schools to police their students’ Internet expression anytime and
anywhere-an unprecedented and unnecessary intrusion on students’ rights.”52 He
further accused the majority of “creating precedent that contravenes the very
values that the First Amendment seeks to protect.”53 For example, the First
Amendment was designed to allow people to criticize school officials, but in this
case school officials silenced Bell’s critical speech.54
Judge Dennis also noted that the Tinker “reasonable forecast” of disruption
standard “could be viewed as somewhat vague” and allowed students speech to be
silenced based on the reactions of others.55 He warned that the majority opinion
allowed school officials to punish Bell because his song offended and angered
them.56
Judge Edward Prado’s dissent emphasized the lack of uniformity in student online
speech cases. He believed that the majority had stretched precedent to apply it to
“purely off-campus speech.”57 He warned that Tinker applied to student speech
that takes place on campus and should be not reflexively applied to off-campus
speech.58 He wrote that the “difficult issue of off-campus online speech will need
to be addressed by the Supreme Court.”59
The Bell case shows that many judges fail to appreciate the speech-protective
approach that Justice Fortas and the Supreme Court had set forth in Tinker. The
Vietnam War was one of the most controversial public issues in modern
American history. The Supreme Court allowed dissenting speech regarding this
most divisive of public issues to receive First Amendment protection. However,
the Fifth Circuit in the Bell case readily allowed the punishment of a student who
blew the whistle on coaches’ alleged sexual harassment.
The Bell decision sanctions the ability of school officials to silence those who
blow the whistle and make officials look bad.60 A group of rappers and rap music
52
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53

Id. at 411 (J. Dennis, dissenting).

54
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55
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scholars explained that the 5th Circuit majority decision discriminated against rap
music, a genre of music with traditions of political and social protest.61
Furthermore, the 5th Circuit allowed school officials to punish a student for
expression he created entirely off-campus. The extension of school officials’
power in the Taylor Bell case is astonishing.62
Bell appealed to the Supreme Court.63 Many speech advocates hoped that the
Court would grant review to clarify the extent of school official’s authority over
off-campus, online speech, an issue that has been unresolved for many years.64
Alas, the Court denied review.
III. You Can’t Wear the American Flag
If punishing a student for rapping about school employees’ misconduct offcampus was not enough, consider the egregious censorship at Live Oak High
School in Northern California. Five Caucasian students wore t-shirts depicting the
American flag to their school on Cinco de Mayo, the Mexican holiday. Some
students objected to the wearing of American flag t-shirts and questioned the
students.65 Another student told an assistant principal: “There be some – there
might be some issues.”66 A group of Mexican students asked the assistant
principal why the Caucasian students “get to wear their flag out when we don’t
get to wear our flag?”67
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The assistant principal met with the students and told them to remove the
American flag t-shirts or turn them inside out. Later, one of the t-shirt wearers
received a threatening text and phone call.68 The assistant principal decided to
censor the students’ political expression in part because there was some racial
tension during the previous year’s Cinco de Mayo at the school.
The students later filed a federal lawsuit, contending that their free-speech rights
were violated because they were not allowed to wear the t-shirts. A federal
district court ruled against them. On appeal, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed based on its expansive application of the
Tinker standard. The panel reasoned that “there was evidence of nascent and
escalating violence at Live Oak.”69 The panel cited both “ongoing racial tension”
and “gang violence within the school.”70
The panel recognized that it was limiting speech based on the reactions of other
students and even referenced that this could “give rise to concerns about a
heckler’s veto.”71 However, the panel reasoned that in the school environment
“the crucial distinction is the nature of the speech, not the source of it.”72 The
panel then analogized the wearing of American flag t-shirt cases to Confederate
flag t-shirt cases.73 The panel concluded that the school officials acted
constitutionally under the Tinker standard by reasonably forecasting substantial
disruption or violence.74
The students petitioned for en banc review, which was denied. However, Judge
Diarmund O’Scannlain dissented from the denial of en banc review with a
bristling dissent.75 He warned that the panel had “condon[ed] the suppression of
free speech by some students because other students might have reacted
violently.”76 He described the “heckler’s veto doctrine” as an important and
venerated principle of First Amendment law.77 He wrote in blunt language: “By
68
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interpreting Tinker to permit the use of the heckler’s veto, the panel opens the
door to the suppression of any viewpoint opposed by a vocal and violent band of
students.”78
The Dariano case represents a repudiation of the spirit of the Tinker ruling.
Perhaps this is why Mary Beth Tinker and John Tinker filed an amicus curiae
brief asking the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case. 79 As one law student
commentator aptly noted, “Peaceful student speech that comments on social or
political issues in a manner that does not bully classmates should not be subject to
blanket restrictions, even if such speech prompts an angry, disruptive reaction.”80
Like Taylor Bell, the Dariano plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.81
They argued in their certiorari petition, that there was “no principled way” to
distinguish the wearing of an American flag t-shirt from the wearing of black
armbands to protest the Vietnam War in Tinker.82 The U.S. Supreme Court denied
review.
Conclusion
Many years ago, Justice Fortas in Tinker proclaimed that “schools are not
enclaves of totalitarianism” and school officials needed to respect the rights of
students.83 Nearly fifty years later, many school officials do not respect the rights
of students. School officials even punish students for purely off-campus
expression that was not truly threatening and for wearing a t-shirt of the American
flag.
Students cannot appreciate the importance of individual liberties if they live in an
environment that constantly disrespects such liberty and values conformity over
the "heckler's veto" itself. Diametrically opposing the Supreme Court's "heckler's veto doctrine" is
the heckler's veto, which refers to the actual act of listeners censoring speech simply because they
disagree.”).
78
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all else.84 In 1943, Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson warned that school
officials should respect student rights lest they “strangle the free mind at its
source and teach youth to discount important principles of government as mere
platitudes.”85 The landmark case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District displayed an attitude of gratitude for students and their rights.
Today, that appreciation has been lost. We must regain it.
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